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"The Constitutional Infringement Zone":' Protest
Pens and Demonstration Zones at the 2004 National
Political Conventions
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of August 14, 1765, a lively crowd of
Bostonians gathered at the giant elm tree at the intersection of
Essex and Orange (now Washington) Streets, just blocks from
Boston Common. Local craftsmen and merchants had planned a
rally to protest the British Parliament's passage of the Stamp Act, a
tax measure set to take effect later that autumn.3
Political theater continued at the tree throughout the day,
culminating in the evening with a mock funeral procession and
burning of effigies of the appointed local stamp collector and the
Parliamentary Lord said to be the Stamp Act's main proponent in
England.4
On November 1, the day the Stamp Act took effect throughout
the British colonies, tensions which had been building in New
York City broke dramatically at night.5 An estimated crowd of
two thousand colonials marched to the British military post at Fort
George and hung an effigy of the colony's royal governor.6 They
next relocated with the effigy to the governor's mansion,
appropriated his fine carriage and used it to parade the effigy
through the streets, concluding with a bonfire of both carriage and
effigy.7 Similar protests occurred throughout the cities and larger
Copyright 2005, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW
1. Editorial, Was It Worth It?, Boston Globe, August 2, 2004, at Al.
2. Pauline E. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals
and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776, at 54
(1972); Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the
Origins of the American Revolution 185 (1986).
3. Nash, supra note 2, at 186-88. The Stamp Act, an effort by Parliament
to charge colonists for some of the costs of British military expenses in the
colonies, set processing fees on legal and other official documents, including
newspapers and advertisements, to be paid in silver or gold to the British
colonial treasury. Violations of the Act were to be prosecuted in colonial
common law and admiralty courts. Maier, supra note 2, at 51 n. 1.
4. Maier, supra note 2, at 54, 56; Nash, supra note 2, at 185.
5. Maier, supra note 2, at 67-68; Nash, supra note 2, at 189-91.
6. Maier, supra note 2, at 68; Nash, supra note 2, at 192.
7. Maier, supra note 2, at 68; Nash, supra note 2, at 191.
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towns of the North American colonies 8 and the uproar eventually
forced Parliament to repeal the Stamp Act in May of 1766.9
The Stamp Act Riots in Boston and New York City signaled
the nascence of a revolutionary movement. During the next
decade, self-professed Patriots and Sons of Liberty took to the
streets and claimed highly visible public areas from local colonial
authorities.' 0  According to historian William Pencak, the
revolutionaries transformed these spaces into liminal realms-
places where the authority of the British empire did not apply and
where colonials employed protest, commemoration, and satire to
act out the forms of revolution long before the Continental
Congress signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776.11
Over three centuries later, large scale protests loomed again in
Boston and New York as the Democratic and Republican national
political conventions neared during the summer of 2004. By this
time, authorities were ready to meet the challenges. The Secret
Service designated the conventions as National Special Security
Events, ensuring the highest magnitude of attention and resources
possible would be directed toward security concerns.12
8. Peter Shaw, American Patriots and the Rituals of Revolution 177
(1981). Locations of other Stamp Act protests included Annapolis, Charleston,
Newport, Philadelphia, and Savannah. Id. at 177-82; Maier, supra note 2, at
55-60, 67; Nash, supra note 2, at 194-96.
9. Maier, supra note 2, at 107; Nash, supra note 2, at 200; Shaw, supra
note 8, at 101, 182.
10. William Pencak, Play as Prelude to Revolution: Boston, 1765-1776, in
Riot and Revelry in Early America 136-41 (William Pencak et al. eds., 2002).
11. Pencak applies the theories of the late philosopher Roberta Kevelson
(1931-1998), who wrote extensively on law and semiotic theory. As described
by Pencak, Kevelson argued in her 1977 book, Inlaws/Outlaws: A Semiotic of
Systematic Interaction, that "one of the most important forces for change in
human history is the interrelationship among play, artistic and intellectual
creation arising from play, statutory law, and political protest." Pencak, supra
note 10, at 125. Pencak suggests convincingly that these crucial forces came
together in revolutionary-era Boston during events like the Stamp Act protests.
With their flouting of colonial authority, creative and satirical effigies, and
control over the physical area surrounding the Liberty Tree, which they
manipulated to serve their protest needs and interests, Pencak's revolutionaries
embodied Kevelson's theories. Id. at 127-28.
12. Press Release, United States Department of State, Ridge Says Al-Qa'ida
Plans Large-Scale Attack on U.S.-Threat Appears Aimed at Disrupting
November National Elections (July 8, 2004), 2004 WL 59153662. When an
event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service
assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation
of the operational security plan. Plans for the event are coordinated with local
law enforcement and public safety personnel in order to ensure a safe and secure
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Convention planners and police departments joined with the Secret
Service to devise intense, complicated, and costly security plans.'
3
The proposed scheme for the Democratic convention in Boston
included a "demonstration zone" to be set up nearby the Fleet
Center arena where the convention was to be staged. This strictly
designated and closed-off area would hold a limited number of
protestors and surround them with metal barricades, mesh netting,
and barbed wire. 14  Armed police personnel would stand by to
monitor the activities. 15 In New York City, security plans included
a restricted perimeter around Madison Square Garden and the
police planned to close off protesters on all sides by using metal
barricades. 1
6
Within these enclosures, protestors were to enjoy freely and
fully the rights of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of
grievances guaranteed by the First Amendment to the federal
Constitution. At the same time, Boston and New York City
authorities confidently promised the safety and security of
convention delegates, guests, and attendees.' The conventions,
national political events set within the centers of two of the
country's largest cities and the first such events since September
11, 2001, attracted intense national and international media
attention. Months had been spent in planning and preparation. In
environment for Secret Service protectees, other dignitaries, the event
participants, and the general public. United States Secret Service, National
Special Security Events, http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml (last visited
Sept. 15, 2005).
13. Congress appropriated fifty million dollars for security costs at each
convention. Glenn Collins, Preparing for the Convention: Security; Behind the
Line of Fire, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2004, at BI; Editorial, Was It Worth It?,
Boston Globe, Aug. 2, 2004, at A10.
14. Jonathan Saltzman, Protest Zone Draws Ire: Court Asked to Rule on
Use of High Barriers and Netting, Boston Globe, July 21, 2004, at Al
[hereinafter Saltzman, Protest Zone Draws Ire].
15. Andrea Estes, Police Getting Expert Aid on DNC Security, Boston
Globe, May 9, 2004, at B1. Estes' article notes that Boston police received
special training from, among others, Israeli suicide terrorism specialists and
crowd control tacticians from Northern Ireland. Id.
16. Julia Preston, Police and Protestors at Odds Over Details for August
Demonstrations, N.Y. Times, June 5, 2004, at B3.
17. Kevin Cullen et al., Convention Gears for Top Security: US., State,
and Local Officers Set for Boston, Boston Globe, July 11, 2004, at Al; Press
Release, Office of the Mayor of the City of New York, Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Governor George E.
Pataki Announce Special Security Designation for New York City's 2004
Convention (July 9, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov.
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theory, the Boston demonstration zone and the New York City
protest pens represented an effective compromise between
dramatically opposing elements: the First Amendment rights of




In practice, the balance seemed likely to favor heavily the latter
at the expense of the former. Shortly before the conventions
opened, individual protesters, joined by loosely organized protest
groups and the American Civil Liberties Union, brought federal
suits in Massachusetts and New York. The plaintiffs prayed for
injunctive relief, claiming that the protest pens and demonstration
zone, as planned, would irreparably violate their First Amendment
rights.20  This comment will analyze the failure of the Boston
plaintiffs and the relative success of the New York plaintiffs in an
effort to formulate the contours of an emerging jurisprudence
regarding this extreme form of crowd control.
Part I of this comment provides the relatively brief legal and
historical background of protest pens and demonstration zones. It
presents the standard test used by courts to analyze time, place, and
manner restrictions on First Amendment rights in public fora, as
articulated in the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism.21 Part II describes the facts of the convention
lawsuits, the parties' positions, and the courts' holdings. Part III
focuses on the Rock Against Racism test used by both courts and
explains how it fails to adequately protect protestors' First
Amendment rights when applied to protest pen and demonstration
zone schemes. Part IV suggests a progressive solution which may
aid future event security planners and protest organizations in
finding a viable middle ground. This is followed by proposed
adjustments to the Rock Against Racism analysis which could
18. Winnie Hu & Michael Slackman, G.O.P. Arrival to Close Streets and
Divert Feet Near Garden, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2004, at Al; Michael Slackman,
A Collision of Security, Democracy, and Daily Life, N.Y. Times, May 8, 2004,
at B 1 [hereinafter Slackman, Collision of Security].
19. An alternate perspective might suggest that the conflict at issue here is
one of competing First Amendment claims rather than a clash between the First
Amendment claims of protesters and the police power of the convention cities as
government actors, but such an inquiry lies beyond the scope of this comment.
20. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327
F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom., Black Tea Soc'y v. City of
Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ.
9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 1593870 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended July 19,
2004).




ensure protection of First Amendment rights without
compromising the legal regime's long-settled familiarity.
I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In their current incarnation, protest pens and demonstration
zones are fairly recent modes of crowd control. Wooden street
barricades have long been used for general crowd control along
sidewalks at parades.22 However, during Rudolph Giuliani's
mayoralty in New York City (1994-2002), metal barricades
became a daily presence to help smooth pedestrian and vehicular
traffic at midtown intersections. 2 3 Use of barricades as complete
enclosures at specific events is not new either, 24 but their
deployment and intensity has increased dramatically in cities
across the nation since the disastrous and widely publicized riots
which occurred during the World Trade Organization's 1999
conference in Seattle, Washington.
25
Security arrangements for the conventions held in connection
with the 2000 presidential elections demonstrated the effects of the
Seattle debacle. 26  Although the Republicans' convention in
Philadelphia that year saw a number of clashes between protestors
and police, 27 no litigation arose over security procedures.
However, the planned arrangements for the Democrats' convention
22. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *3.
23. Jack Newfield, The Full Rudy: the Man, the Mayor, the Myth, The
Nation, June 17, 2002, at 11. The Stauber opinion notes that "[t]he NYPD has
shifted from using wooden barricades for pens to using interlocking, metal
barricades because the metal ones are more effective in keeping people inside
the pen, because they interlock, and because they are more difficult to knock
over." Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *9.
24. Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 744 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1020, 120 S. Ct. 528 (1999) (Ku Klux Klan rally); Olivieri v. Ward, 801 F.2d
602, 604 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917, 107 S. Ct. 1371 (1987) (gay
pride parade); Housing Works, Inc. v. Safir, 101 F. Supp. 2d 163, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (AIDS organization's press conferences and rallies).
25. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston,
327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2004). A report commissioned by Seattle's
city council and issued in September 2000 concluded that "this city became the
laboratory for how American cities will address mass protests. In many ways, it
became a vivid demonstration of what not to do." Report of the Seattle City
Council WTO Accountability Review Committee (Sept. 14, 2000),
http://www.cityofseattle.net/wtocommittee/arcfinal.pdf.
26. Lynda Gorov, Ruling Puts L.A. Protesters Closer to Democratic
Convention, Boston Globe, July 21, 2000, at A17; Todd S. Purdum, The
Democrats: The Protesters; Los Angeles Keeps Its Eyes On Protesters and the
Police, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 2000, at Al.
27. Estes, supra note 15.
2005]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
in Los Angeles spawned at least one such lawsuit in federal court,
Service Employee International Union, Local 660 v. City of Los
Angeles [hereinafter SEIU].28
The Los Angeles convention security arrangements
foreshadowed those designed for the Democrats' 2004 convention
in Boston. These arrangements, prepared by the Los Angeles
police department, the Secret Service, and other convention
planners and agencies, consisted primarily of an extremely large
"secured zone" surrounding the Staples Center, with access limited
to holders of convention tickets or Secret Service credentials.29
Outside of this zone and quite some distance away (260 yards)
from the entrance where convention delegates would arrive and
depart, the planners located a small "demonstration zone."3 ° The
Los Angeles plaintiffs, a variety of protest organizations and
individuals, claimed the zone arrangements would violate their
First Amendment speech and assembly rights if officials deployed
the plans as designed.3'
In analyzing the plaintiffs' claim, the SEIU district court
worked within the parameters of a long-settled First Amendment
"time, place, and manner" standard required of government or state
efforts to restrict speech and assembly in traditional public fora.32
The roots of this legal regime stretch back to the nineteenth
century, when cities and towns began to deal with public preaching
by Jehovah's Witnesses. 33  The doctrine evolved during the
twentieth century through cases dealing with the labor movement
during the Great Depression 34 and came to full flower during the
civil rights and anti-war demonstrations of the late 1960s and early
1970s."
28. Service Employee Int'l Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
29. Id. at 968, 969. See also Gorov, supra note 26.
30. Service Employees Int'l, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 968, 969.
31. Id. at 968.
32. Id. at 970-72. The Los Angeles parties stipulated that the locations in
dispute were situated within a traditional public forum. Id. at 970.
33. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S. Ct. 1148 (1948); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762 (1941); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43, 17 S. Ct. 731 (1897).
34. Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 60
S. Ct. 146 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).
35. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972)
(black power demonstration outside high school); Flower v. U.S., 407 U.S. 197,
92 S. Ct. 1842 (1972) (peace activist leafleting in civilian street within
unrestricted area of military base); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S. Ct.
453 (1965) (civil rights demonstration outside courthouse).
[Vol. 66
COMMENTS
In recent decades the analysis has remained fairly settled.36
The courts deciding SEIU in 2000 and the 2004 convention cases
applied the "time, place, and manner" test as articulated by the
Supreme Court in its 1989 decision, Ward v. Rock Against
Racism.37 In that case, the Court upheld a New York City noise
regulation requiring that city sound systems and technicians be
utilized at all musical performances in the city's parks. 3
8
Essentially, the Rock Against Racism test ensures that government
attempts to restrict the time, place, and manner for exercise of free
speech and assembly in public fora must satisfy three test factors:
"such restrictions must be 1) justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, 2) narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and 3) leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.
3 9
Applying this test to the "secured zone" and "demonstration
zone" arrangements for the Democrats' 2000 convention in Los
Angeles, the SEIU court initially noted the parties' stipulations that
the space in question was a traditional public forum and that the
security plans were content-neutral, thus removing two elements
from the analytical inquiry. 4° The opinion focuses primarily on the
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest" and
"alternative channels" elements.41
Importantly for the purposes of this comment, the SEIU court
rejected the Los Angeles defendants' claims that the extensive
nature of the planned zone arrangements could be justified as a
"significant government interest" by the need for adequate security
associated with the presence of prominent people, fears of
terrorism, and the possibility that demonstrators might exaggerate
their actions to engage the media.42 With the then-recent Seattle
WTO fiasco likely in the minds of all involved, the SEIU
36. Thomas v. City of Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 122 S. Ct. 775
(2002) (reaffirming suitability of analysis); see also Capitol Square Review Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995); Forsyth County, Ga. v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992); U.S. v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983).
37. 491 U.S. 781, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
38. Id. at 789-90, 109 S. Ct. at 2753.
39. Id.
40. The court actually questioned the secured zone's neutrality because,
while speech and assembly rights were not restricted within its boundaries,
access to it was limited to those persons chosen by the Democratic National
Convention Committee and the Secret Service. Service Employees Int'l Union,
Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
41. Id. at 971.
42. Id. at 971-73.
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defendants claimed the necessity to prepare for a "worst case
scenario., 43 The SEIU court could reasonably have gone against
the plaintiffs on this point, but refused to do so: "The government
cannot infringe on First Amendment rights on the mere speculation
that violence may occur.
44
In that regard, the SEIU court did not find the Los Angeles
arrangements to be narrowly tailored: the secured zone was to be
off limits for an unreasonable twenty-four hours a day (time); at
nearly 185 acres, it was entirely too large (place); and its distance
from the demonstration zone precluded virtually all possibility of
communication between protestors and delegates (manner).45
Finally, the SEIU court decided that the convention's planned
demonstration zone did not allow for ample alternative means of
communication sufficient to compensate for the loss of speech
petition, and assembly activities forbidden in the secured zone. 
4
The court acknowledged the importance to the protestors of
communicating effectively with their primary audience, the
convention delegates and attendees.47 By situating protestors so
far away, well outside the excessively large secured zone, the
defendants' scheme presented no alternative at all, much less an
adequate one. Concludin 8tersely that "the First Amendment does
not permit such a result,' the court agreed with the plaintiffs on
all counts, granted their plea for injunction, and ordered the
convention authorities to rework the zones prior to the
convention's opening date.49
The SEIU case, which was not appealed, stands as the most
important precedent to the 2004 convention cases in nearly every
respect. The court's detailed and fully-considered application of
the Rock Against Racism test, rational approach to security
concerns, and recognition of the validity of plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights should have served as unquestionable
precedents in the 2004 cases. Unfortunately, by 2004, the SEIU
court's approach seemed naive, archaic, and even quaint.
43. Id. at 972.
44. Id. at 971.
45. Id. at 971-72.
46. Id. at 972-73.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 972-73.
49. Id. at 975.
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II. FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE 2004 CONVENTION
CASES
Like SEIU, the suits filed by protesters over the protest pen and
demonstration zone schemes planned for the 2004 conventions
were analyzed under the time, place, and manner test. However,
much had changed in four years and the outcomes of the 2004
cases demonstrate the tenor of the evolving legal doctrine at work.
A. Coalition to Protest the Democratic National Convention v.
City of Boston
50
The security plan developed for the Democrats' 2004
convention in Boston resembled the plan described in SEIU. The
Secret Service controlled a "hard security zone" surrounding the
Fleet Center and agents restricted entry to those with convention or
Secret Service clearance. 5' Unlike the Los Angeles scheme,
however, the Boston plan also included a "soft security zone" to
the south of the Fleet Center and the hard zone. 52 The city retained
control over the soft zone, which contained restaurants, bars, and
stores which were to remain open during the convention. 53 Access
to the soft zone was not restricted; the city planned to allow
leafleting and small demonstrations of fifty or fewer people.54
As in Los Angeles, the Boston authorities included a
demonstration zone in their plans and opened planning
negotiations with organization representatives as early as January
of 2003. 55  These negotiations apparently concluded with a
mutually acceptable compromise as to the zone's location, but the
zone itself was not constructed until one week before the
convention opened. When the creatively-named activist group
Black Tea Society saw the actual site, they immediately filed suit
in federal district court and moved for injunction. 56
50. 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass 2004). Although the suit concerning the
Republican National Convention in New York City was filed before the Boston
suit, the Boston convention and the events at issue in the litigation occurred first,
so they have been treated in that order in this comment.
51. Id. at 65.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 65-66.
55. Boston Globe Staff, Impasse Seen on Protest Talks, Boston Globe, Mar.
28, 2004, at B4.
56. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327
F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D. Mass. 2004).
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The judge assigned to the case toured the site personally and
his striking description suggests the plaintiffs had good reason to
complain: "The overall impression created by the DZ
[demonstration zone] is that of an internment camp... [it] conveys
the symbolic sense of a holding pen . . . .Indeed, one cannot
conceive of what other design elements could be put into a space to
create more of a symbolic affront to the role of free expression."
57
These "design elements" included abandoned elevated subway
tracks fairly low overhead that were outfitted with loops of razor
wire and supported by concrete girders planted throughout the
zone. On the ground, a double perimeter of concrete barriers
topped with eight foot tall chain link fences and covered with59hgavy black mesh netting and fabric enclosed the zone area.
Atop the overhead tracks, convention authorities planned to
post armed police and National Guardsmen, thus taking advantage
of the tracks' elevation as a vantage point for convention security
operations.60 If the armed police and guardsmen overhead had an
excellent view of the delegates coming and going, those
underneath in the zone had little such chance due to the distance,
angles, and nearly opaque mesh material between the zone and the
convention arrival area. I
As in SEIU, the Boston trial court applied the Supreme Court's
Rock Against Racism test: time, place, and manner restrictions in
public fora must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and must
leave open alternative channels for communication.6
2
Unfortunately, the court's analysis is somewhat incomplete.
Although its introductory section on "General First Amendment
Principles" refers to the public forum and content neutrality
aspects of the inquiry,6 3 the opinion does not mention these in its
analysis of the Boston demonstration zone.64  However, in its
57. Id. at 74-75.
58. Id. at 67. At the lowest point, the "ceiling" of the zone was just five
feet, nine inches off the ground. Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Inspects Protest
Zone: Judge, Activists Compare the Area to a Prison, Boston Globe, July 22,
2004, at B I [hereinafter Saltzman, Judge Inspects Protest Zone].
59. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 67. See also Saltzman, Protest
Zone Draws Ire, supra note 14.
60. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id. at 69. In fact, the court cited Service Employees Int'l as a precedent.
Id. at 73-74.
63. Id. at 69-70.
64. This lacuna seems due more to the compressed time frame in which this
litigation occurred than to any conscious omission on the part of the court. The
problem of timing in this litigation played as great a role in the plaintiffs' loss as
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treatment of a companion case, brought by a separate set of
plaintiffs to challenge the restriction against parades in the soft
zone, the Boston trial court did note that the space in question
constituted a public forum and that the parade restriction, was
clearly not content-based.65 It may be assumed, therefore, that
these conclusions extended to the court's analysis of the Boston
demonstration zone plans.
Although the trial court's opinion suffers from a certain
formlessness, 66 its analysis of the Boston demonstration zone
focuses primarily, like that of the SEIU court, on the "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest" facet of the
Rock Against Racism test. In light of Secret Service testimony that
the (post-trial) reconfigured Los Angeles demonstration zone in
SEIU proved insufficient to keep some protesters from throwing
things at delegates and security personnel during the 2000
convention,67 the Boston judge found the "design elements" of the
Boston demonstration zone however miserable, to be "reasonable
in light of past experience.
In a footnote, the judge wrote that he had asked defense
counsel for the Boston and federal authorities whether any "event-
specific" threats had been posed.69  The U.S. Attorneys
participating on defense indicated the government did, in fact, have
such evidence but they refused to share it with plaintiffs, citing
"the potential difficulties for law enforcement and various
investigations., 70 Still in the footnote, the judge noted first that he
any other factor and will be treated more fully in this comment's analytical
section.
65. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
66. Again, probably due to time constraints.
67. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
68. Id. at 75.
69. Id. at 75 n.2.
70. Id. This claim engenders at least a shadow of doubt in light of reported
statements by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge that no specific threats
to the Boston convention had been derived from intelligence sources. Cullen,
supra note 17. Even so, undercover Boston police may indeed have been
investigating organizations like the Black Tea Society. Jenna Russell, Anti-
Violence Black Tea Activists Draw Attention of Authorities, Boston Globe, July
24, 2004, at Al. According to a report by CNN, the New York Times
uncovered an October 2003 FBI memorandum directed to law enforcement
agencies at all levels of government urging them to monitor protest activity in
their localities and report any "potentially illegal acts" back to the FBI.
Furthermore, the CNN report adds that the Department of Justice issued its own
memorandum concluding that the FBI's suggested actions raised no First
2005]
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omitted this ex parte information from his ruminations, then also,
curiously, that he had considered it enough to aver that nothing in
the received information disproved or refuted his decision to deny
plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief.71 The judge then ordered
the sensitive information sealed for potential use in connection
with any appeal.72
As to the "alternative channels" question, the Boston court's
opinion says merely that the "constraints of time, geography, and
safety" did not allow for modifications to the zone which might
have rendered it less miserable. 73  While the judge found the
situation "irretrievably sad," he denied the plaintiffs' request for
injunction. 74
On expedited appeal to the First Circuit, the Black Tea Society
plaintiffs initially hoped to convince the court that the convention
zone arrangements constituted a prior restraint seeking to prevent
speech rather than a "time, place, and manner" regulation of
speech.75 If so, the plaintiffs argued, the lower court erred in
applying an intermediate standard requiring only that the
regulations be reasonable.7 6  The appellate panel rejected this
challenge, citing Supreme Court precedent that security-based
regulations do not rise to the level of prior restraints, which require
a more strict burden of proof.
77
Examining the lower court's application of the Rock Against
Racism time, place, and manner test, the First Circuit panel found
the zone arrangements to be clearly content-neutral and accepted,
without question as to proof, the government's claimed interest in
the maintenance of security at the convention. 78 While the panel
agreed that the zone arrangements did impose a "substantial
burden on free expression," it nevertheless allowed significant
deference to "the government's judgment as to the best means for
Amendment concerns. Bob Barr, FBI Tactics Chilling Political Speech, Aug.
25, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/25/chill.political.speech/index.
html.
71. Coal to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75 n.2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 75-76.
74. Id. at 78.
75. Black Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004). The
appellate panel delivered its decision on July 26, 2004, the first day of the




78. Id. at 12-13.
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achieving its legitimate objectives., 79 The panel's opinion focuses
instead on the narrowly tailored and alternative channels test
elements.
80
The plaintiffs argued on the first point that because the city had
shown no evidence that Boston demonstrators planned to use any
of the disruptive techniques seen in Seattle and Los Angeles, the
convention authorities' police power should not extend to
burdening protestors' First Amendment rights so substantially on
the basis of "unrelated past experiences." The city's authority,
plaintiffs argued, should instead be limited to "arresting miscreants
and punishing unlawful conduct after it occurred. 82
The appellate panel rejected these arguments.8 3 While its
opinion noted that unsupported references to "isolated past events"
should not justify substantial burdens on speech, it allowed that
"the degree to which inferences drawn from past experience are
plausible" is a valid factor.84 Like the trial court, the appellate
panel declined to consider the Secret Service evidence proffered ex
parte in camera.8 5 It thus found the lower court's weighting of the
security concerns to be reasonable and upheld the finding that the
zone arrangements were narrowly tailored.86
Concerning the "alternative channels of communication"
element of the time, place, and manner test, the appellate panel
dismissed plaintiffs' argument that the zone arrangements left
demonstrators no options "within sight and sound of the
delegates."87 The demonstration zone itself, while "imperfect," did
indeed provide such an opportunity. 88 The court also noted the
availability of the soft zone for leafleting and small scale group
protests and the possibility of larger permitted protests at other
locations in Boston. 89  Finally, the panel added, demonstrators
could take their case to delegates via television, radio, the press,
the internet and "other outlets," so the lower court had not erred in
finding against plaintiffs on the "alternative channels" test
79. Id. at 13.
80. Id
81. Id See also Million Youth March v. Safir, 63 F. Supp. 2d 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
82. Black Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 13.
83. Id. at 14.
84. Id. at 13-14.
85. Id. at 13 n.3.
86. Id. at 13-14.
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element. 90  The appellate court thus fully affirmed the lower
court's decision.
9 1
Another panel member concurred, expanding on the issues of
timing, choice of site, event-specific intelligence, and the post-9/ 11
environment. 92  This writing's tone expresses a barely masked
distaste with the plaintiffs' case. It criticizes the plaintiffs for
bringing the lawsuit at such a late date (apparently disregarding the
fact cited in the lower court's opinion that the demonstration zone
had been set up only a week prior to the convention opening
date),93 suggests that their expectations of a better demonstration
zone constituted "unjustified reliances on verbal representations"
made by event organizers and local authorities,94 and indicates that
the trial court could, in fact, have had the authority to examine the
Secret Service's ex parte in camera evidence without allowing the
plaintiffs an opportunity to refute it.95 Judging from the tone of
this concurrence and the expressed deference of the majority
opinion, it seems the Boston plaintiffs' case was lost from the
outset.
B. Stauber v. City of New York
96
Unlike the Boston plaintiffs, the New York City protesters
could file their suit well ahead of time, largely because the
individual plaintiffs experienced the New York City police
department's penning policies first-hand in a Februar- 2003
demonstration opposing United States actions in Iraq. The
plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they alleged from the 2003
demonstration and injunctive relief to forestall similar treatment at
the 2004 convention.98 The Stauber court found the presented
facts regarding the police department's use of pens at the 2003
demonstration and other similar events relevant and detailed them
thoroughly. 99
At the 2003 demonstration, the New York Police Department
set up metal barricades on either side of First Avenue, a wide
90. Id.
91. Id. at 15.




96. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL
1593870 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended July 19, 2004).
97. Id. at* 18.
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at **3-8.
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thoroughfare running north and south on the east side of
Manhattan, in order to contain demonstration crowds near the
United Nations building.'00 Each block had barricades set across
its south end to permit vehicular traffic through the cross streets.'
0
'
As each city block "pen" filled to capacity, holding approximately
four thousand people, 10 2 police set up barricades across the north
end to permit traffic across the next cross street, thus creating a
four sided perimeter enclosing demonstrators. 03 These large pens
began at Fifty-First Street and stretched north by perhaps thirty
blocks as an estimated eighty thousand protesters arrived for the
2003 demonstration.
104
Police officers guarded thepens at the north and south edges
which bordered cross streets. 1°5  Two of the Stauber plaintiffs
testified that when they tried to leave the pens to use bathrooms or
buy hot drinks, the police refused to let them out. 10 6 Witnesses
testified also that when protesters did manage to leave the pens,
they might not be permitted back inside to rejoin their friends and
fellow demonstrators. 1
07
As a result of these experiences, the Stauber plaintiffs believed
their speech and assembly rights had been violated and would be
violated again if the police employed the same pen program during
the 2004 convention. 10 8  The plaintiffs further alleged that the
unpleasantness of the pens would chill the desire of people who
might otherwise wish to attend the convention demonstrations. 109
The Stauber court analyzed this dispute under the threshold
standard that "presence at a demonstration ... is a form of speech
and assembly in a public forum, and accordingly 'receives a more
heightened protection under the First Amendment.""' 0 It applied
the Rock Against Racism test: the intended time, place, and
manner restriction must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
100. Id. at *4.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *9.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id. at **5-6.
105. Id. at *5.
106. Id. at *6.
107. Id. at *10.
108. Id. at *15.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *24 (quoting United Yellow Cab Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Safir, No.
98 Civ. 3670, 1998 WL 274295, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1998)).
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serve a significant government interest, and such as to allow ample
alternative channels for expression. III
The plaintiffs did not challenge the pen policy for content
neutrality or for serving a significant government interest by
allowing the police to reasonably maintain public peace and
order. 17 Instead, their claim focused on the "narrowly tailored"
aspect of the test and they asked the court to find that the pens
might be managed to allow more freedom of entry and exit during
convention protests.1
3
The city defendants responded that public safety concerns
would be heightened during the 2004 convention, thus, the current
restrictive pen policies should remain in effect." 4  The city's
police chief testified that the pens were necessary to ensure
emergency access through the streets so that medical or police
personnel could address a crime situation or other emergency.' 
5
The city also argued that the desired access adjustments sought by
the plaintiffs would negatively affect the police department's
"crowd control and safety interests."'1 6 Finally, the city contended
that penning was merely a practical preventive measure and not an
active effort "conducted for unconstitutional reasons."'1l 7 Despite
these defensive efforts, the Stauber judge agreed with the
plaintiffs, finding that the near-absolute entry and exit restrictions
rendered the current pen practices unreasonable and not narrowly
tailored. 558
The Stauber court's opinion stated that, having found a
"narrow tailorin " violation, it need not address the "alternative
channels" issue. & However, for purposes of thoroughness, the
court noted its finding that the pens, combined with street closings,
left protestors no alternative to either protest elsewhere in the
111. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *25 (citing Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989)).
112. Id. at *25.
113. Id. at **22, 28.
114. Id. at *32.
115. Id. at "3.
116. Id. at *28.
117. Id. at *21. The defendants finally claimed, intriguingly, that if the
plaintiffs' requests were granted, the result would constitute a federalism
problem of unfair intrusion by the federal government, in the form of the trial
court, into the city's police power. The court listed a number of previous cases
where federalism concerns had not stopped trial and appellate courts from
assigning and upholding similar injunctions and concluded that such intrusion
was no more than minimal. Id. at *32.




vicinity or even to leave when they wished to do so. 12 0 The court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief and
directed the city to adjust its pen practices to allow greater freedom
of exit and entry during the convention demonstrations.' 2' The
case has not been appealed.
The New York City plaintiffs succeeded largely because their
claim was pragmatic, backed by actual experience, and filed in
sufficient time for the court to direct defendants' remediation of
the asserted problems well in advance of the convention.
Unfortunately, whatever promise of a peaceful convention Stauber
brought remained unfulfilled. The whirlwind of events that
ultimately occurred during the convention resulted in nearly two
thousand arrests, a significant number of which have since been
found to be wrongful. Even so, Stauber stands solidly on the
middle ground between the SEIU and Boston cases. 123
III. ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS APPLYING THE ROCKAGAINSTRACISM
TEST
The courts deciding the 2004 convention pen and zone cases
did not question whether the Rock Against Racism test might not
be suitable for the subject matter. Although this test has long been
the standard for "time, place, and manner" regulations on speech
and expression in public fora, it does not adequately confront a
number of factors unique to pen and zone cases. These include
whether the pen and zone schemes are truly content-neutral, the
extent to which government entities must provide evidence of an
actual and not merely suspected security threat to demonstrate the
significant government interest, increasingly low judicial standards
as to what constitutes a narrowly tailored regulation, the
inadequacy and unsuitability of suggested alternative channels, the
considerable time sensitivity involved, and, finally, the lack of a
120. Id.
121. Id. at *33.
122. Jim Dwyer, Videos Challenge Hundreds of Convention Arrests, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 2005, at Al ("Seven months after the convention at Madison
Square Garden, criminal charges have fallen against all but a handful of people
arrested that week. Of the 1,670 cases that have run their full course, ninety-one
percent ended with the charges dismissed or with a verdict of not guilty after trial.
Many were dropped without any finding of wrongdoing, but also without any serious
inquiry into the circumstances of the arrests, with the Manhattan district attorney's
office agreeing that the cases should be 'adjourned in contemplation of dismissal."');
See also Editorial, On the Streets, Police . Boston Globe, Sept. 3, 2004, at
A20 (provides a contemporary account).
123. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870.
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written and promulgated statute, ordinance or regulation to be
subjected to analysis.
A. Content Neutrality
Although content neutrality is generally listed in conjunction
with the other elements of the Rock Against Racism test, it ranks
essentially first amongst equals. In determining content neutrality,
courts ask whether the restriction at issue has been justified (by the
government or state actor) without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, 124 or, more directly, whether the government or
state actor seeks to restrict the speech at issue "because of
disagreement with the message it conveys."' 125  If the court
determines the restriction is indeed based on the content of the
message being conveyed, the analysis moves necessarily into a
much higher degree of scrutiny. Such restrictions are "presumed
to be unconstitutional" 126 and can only be justified by recourse to a
compelling (not merely significant) state or government interest,' 27
a much higher hurdle for a restriction to overcome. Thus, in the
time, place, and manner analysis, if a restriction is deemed content-
based, the analysis should not even reach the other two factors.
The current legal regime largely takes as a given that speech
restrictions are content-neutral and the case opinions at issue in this
comment spend barely a sentence on the question. However,
Supreme Court Justices Thurgood Marshall and Antonin Scalia
(who one might rarely find on the same side of an issue) have both
expressed suspicions that facially content-neutral restrictions may
often be far less neutral than they appear.
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence, 28 a direct
ancestor of Rock Against Racism, protest groups who sought to
highlight the plight of the nation's homeless requested permission
to sleep overnight in temporary "tent cities" set up as campsites in
Washington D.C.'s Mall and Lafayette Park. 129 The Court upheld
the restriction at issue, a National Park Service ban on camping in
124. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 778, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746,
2753 (1989) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069 (1984)).
125. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 2754 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 295, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3070 (1984)).
126. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
828, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1995).
127. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1995).
128. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S. Ct.
3065 (1984).
129. Id. at 291-92, 104 S. Ct. at 3068.
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those particular parks. 130 In dissent, Justice Marshall sounded an
alarm over the direction the time, place, and manner test was
evolving, namely, toward a split between content-based regulations
subjected to strict scrutiny and content-neutral regulations
subjected to supposedly intermediate scrutiny. In Justice
Marshall's view, undesirable expression could easily be squelched
by a superficially neutral regulation: "[F]acial ... neutrality is no
shield against unnecessary restrictions on unpopular ideas or
modes of expression."' 3 '
Justice Scalia, dissenting in the 2000 case Hill v. Colorado,32
explained how a First Amendment regulation could be neutral as
written and promulgated, yet content-based in spirit and
application. 133 The Hill Court upheld a complicated state criminal
statute regulating "speech related conduct within one hundred feet
of the entrance to any health care facility,"' 134 finding the statute
neutral as a time, place, and manner regulation. 135 Quite complex
itself, Justice Scalia's dissent claims that the statute at issue,
however blandly drafted, physically segregates pro-life activists
who wish to demonstrate on sidewalks in front of abortion clinics
and that it does so on the basis of the expected content of the
activists' speech. 1
36
Although the Hill statute seemingly applies to everyone and
anyone who might have a piece to speak in front of a medical
facility, Justice Scalia posits that it is aimed at a specific class of
protestors and, by extension, the content of what they may be
expected to say.137 For emphasis, Scalia avers that "I have no
doubt that this regulation would be deemed content-based in an
instant if the case before us involved antiwar protestors .. 138
130. Id. at 289, 104 S. Ct. at 3067.
131. Id. at 316, 104 S. Ct. at 3080 (Marshall, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Marshall, evidence in the record suggested that the restriction in question
may have arisen out of political concerns and pressures to combat the plaintiffs'
goal of sleeping in the parks as a symbolic protest to call attention to the plight
of the homeless rather than, as the government stated, concerns for wear and tear
on the park. Although this point is not developed, if proven, it might indeed
have demonstrated that the regulation was content-based rather than neutral. Id.
at 315-16, 104 S. Ct. at 3080.
132. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741-65, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2503-15
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 742-49, 120 S. Ct. at 2503-07.
134. Id. at 707, 120 S. Ct. at 2484 (majority).
135. Id. at 725, 730, 120 S. Ct. at 2494, 2497.
136. Id. at 744, 120 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 742, 120 S. Ct. at 2503.
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Although Justice Scalia might be surprised to find himself in
company with Justice Marshall, his dissent in Hill raises the same
point: Statutes drafted in a neutral manner may be content-based
once one looks beyond the words and divines the true intent of
regulations which restrict First Amendment rights in public fora.
Taking this lead, the assumed neutrality of the 2004 convention
pen and zone schemes should be questioned more thoroughly,
particularly because these schemes were devised by authorities
having a far greater interest in avoiding protest speech than in
reasonably accommodating it. A large motive in luring the
national political conventions, indeed, any major convention or
significant event like the Olympics or the Super Bowl, is for a host
city to attract the spending power of delegates and to put on a great
show for those delegates and for the national media.1 39
Convention boosters recruit business communities with promises
of boom days. 140  Host city mayors become deeply involved in
bidding for conventions and great effort is taken to resolve labor
disputes and other such sticking points that might mar the
presentation.' 41 Those representing the city, then, are motivated to
keep the peace largely by keeping noisy and irate demonstrators far
away from delegates and other visitors.
National political party personnel are equally interested in
smooth sailing. Regarding clashes between Los Angeles police
and demonstrators at the 2000 Democratic convention, a top aide
to the Gore presidential campaign who observed the action from a
rooftop announced that: "We knew what they [the police] were
doing and we supported them."' 42  Arianna Huffington, a
California political personage whose "shadow convention" in Los
139. Was It Worth It?, supra note 13.
140. Id. Although some predicted the Boston convention would bring $154
million in benefits to the local economy, it is not clear whether this money
materialized and many restaurants near the Fleet Center were reported to be
"almost deserted" during the convention. Id. In New York City, the host
committee urged local businesses to remain open because the area would be full
of extra personnel for the convention and "they all must eat!" Hu & Slackman,
supra note 18.
141. Rick Klein, Convention Protests Must Meet New Rules, Boston Globe,
May 6, 2004, at Al. In the months preceding the convention, the Boston police
and several city unions staged demonstrations during convention preparations at
the Fleet Center. Id. New York City Mayor Bloomberg contended with
persistent rumors that Penn Station, the nation's busiest commuter rail station,
would be shut down as it is located right next to Madison Square Garden.
Michael Slackman, Penn Station is to Stay Open During G.O.P. Convention, N.
Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2004, at B3 [hereinafter Slackman, Penn Station].
142. Purdum, supra note 26.
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Angeles was broken up by police, noted that the police "were
making a distinction between the people inside the Staples Center,
who had to be protected at all costs, and the people outside who
they regard as a threat."'
' 43
In conclusion, the line between regulating speech and
regulating where speech occurs is not always clear. Although the
2004 convention planners at no point discriminated against any
groups in particular, their security measures may not have been as
blandly neutral as alleged and the courts did not question them on
this point. Although the Boston demonstration zone could
theoretically have been filled by pro-Kerry demonstrators and the
protest pens outside Madison Square Garden in New York City
could have housed pro-Bush demonstrators, common -sense argues
this would not be the case. Thus, there is good reason to lend
credence to Justice Scalia's implication that the authorities who set
such "neutral" regulations know, with a fair degree of accuracy,
who will be targeted and thus may shape and place the regulations
to meet unstated aims which may not be neutral at all. At the 2004
conventions, the pens and zones would most likely be filled by
protesters expressing views that did not fit well into the upbeat and
urbane images the Boston and New York City authorities wished
to project. If so, the assumed content neutrality of the pens and
zones should not be so easily accepted.
B. "Significant Government Interest" and Convention Security
Concerns
Since the 1999 Seattle difficulties, those responsible for
planning security at the national political conventions have largely
maintained a "worst case scenario" mentality. 44  The courts
deciding the 2004 convention cases acknowledged the importance
of security concerns, but their differing treatments of the issue
raise a concern unique to pen and zone schemes for which the Rock
Against Racism test's generic "significant government interest"
requirement does not provide sufficient guidance: In the absence
of event-specific evidence of an actual threat, how much may
security planners rely on either past events or unspecified concerns
to prove their claims of a significant government interest?
143. Id.
144. Black Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004); Coal.
to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61, 64 (D. Mass. 2004); Stauber v. City of New York, No. 3 Civ. 9162 (RWS),
2004 WL 1593870, *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended, July 19, 2004);
Service Employee Int'l Union, Local 660 v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp.
2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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1. Boston: Triumph of Fear Over Freedom145
The decisions in the Boston convention cases illustrate what
can happen to protest plaintiffs' First Amendment concerns when
courts accept the government's claimed "significant government
interest" at face value. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, the Supreme Court easily accepted as sufficient and
legitimate the Park Service's claimed interest in preserving the
condition of Washington D.C.'s parks and upheld the proposed ban
on symbolic camping. 146  Justice Marshall's dissent, however,
pointed out that the government had not advanced any evidence
that permission of the symbolic overnight camping would cause
any greater wear and tear on park property than other permissible
daytime forms of protest activity.
As to the government's claims of potential administrative
overload that could accompany opening the capitol's parks to
camping, Justice Marshall found no "factual showing that evinces
a real, as opposed to a merely speculative, problem... there are no
substantial government interests advanced by the government's
regulations ... [only] the prerogatives of a bureaucracy that over
the years has shown an implacable hostility toward citizens'
exercise of First Amendment rights."'
148
The courts deciding the Boston convention cases clearly
surrendered to the Boston authorities' reports as to unrelated past
events and undocumented future scenarios and skipped over a
reasoned assessment of whether the government had properly
demonstrated its claimed significant government interest. Both
Boston opinions refer to the 1999 Seattle fiasco, the security
problems at the 2000 Los Angeles convention, and September 11,
2001, noting particularly that Boston's Logan Airport had been the
embarkation point for the hijacked planes on that day. 149 While
145. Eileen McNamara, Fencing Freedom In, Boston Globe, July 25, 2004,
at B1.
146. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296, 104 S.
Ct. 3065, 3070 (1984).
147. Id. at 311, 104 S. Ct. at 3078 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 311-12, 104 S. Ct. at 3077, 3078. Five years later, in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, the Court noted simply that "the city enjoys a substantial
interest in ensuring the ability of its citizens to enjoy whatever benefits the city
parks have to offer." 491 U.S. 781, 797, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989). Again in
dissent, Justice Marshall averred that the majority "replaces constitutional
scrutiny with mandatory deference." Id. at 803, 109 S. Ct. at 2760 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
149. Black Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 10, 13, 16-19; Coal. to Protest, 327 F.
Supp. 2d at 64, 73, 75.
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security concerns doubtless deserved a great degree of weight, the
Boston decisions allowed these concerns to override the plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights on the basis of very little actual proof.
The Boston trial court, in particular, cited Stauber, then
recently decided, where the court did indeed require "event-
specific" proof from the government, 150 but declined to follow its
lead, giving no particular reason for not doing so. It is inexplicable
why Stauber, an indisputably current and on-point precedent
decided by a jurisdiction in New York City, with its extensive
history of mass public protest, 151 should have been summarily
ignored by the District Court of Massachusetts and the First
Circuit, jurisdictions arguably having much less actual experience
in the field.
Aside from the trial court judge's choices as to judicial
precedents, the Boston convention cases raise a more disturbing
problem, one not addressable within the generic confines of the
Rock Against Racism test. This dilemma raises questions
associated with the Secret Service's offer to provide the court, but
not the plaintiffs, with apparently persuasive event-specific
intelligence to substantiate the defendants' claims that security
concerns mandated the extreme solution of the demonstration
zone. 152 Should compelling national security concerns like those
presented by the convention justify an exceptional ex parte in
camera judicial consideration of privileged information not shared
with opposing counsel? If not, do projected problems and past
examples of security failures and successes at unrelated yet
comparable events constitute a sufficiently significant government
interest to justify extreme measures like the Boston demonstration
zone?
The Boston courts' answers to these questions are "Maybe"
and "Yes." Both courts avoided the first question by expressly
150. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 74. The Stauber case's approach
will be more fully discussed infra.
151. Like Washington, D.C., New York City has long been a center of large
scale public protest activity, with historical events like Samuel Gompers' 1886
May Day speech in Union Square, the occupation of Columbia University by
anti-war demonstrators during 1968 and any number of demonstrations which
occur almost daily near the United Nations building. Hu & Slackman, supra
note 18; see also Will Kessler, Anything But "Labor Day," Aspen Daily News,
available at http://www.aspendailynews.com/searchcolumns/viewcolumn.cfm
?orderform-477; The Columbia University Electronic Encyclopedia,
http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/history/A0847020.htnl; Andy Humm,
Restricting Demonstrations, Gotham Gazette, Mar. 5, 2003, available at
http://www.gothamgazette.com/print/299.
152. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75 n.2.
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disregarding the government's selectively proffered evidence,
however tempting it may have been.' 53 However, the concurrence
to the appellate opinion suggests that although judicial
consideration of ex parte in camera information in non-criminal
merits determinations is generally to be avoided, some circuits
have suggested allowing such considerations in exceptional
circumstances where national security is at issue.
154
While the sensitivity of confidential intelligence information
must be protected, such an exception can only trouble First
Amendment advocates. Allowing a judge to view the reports and
take them into account but refusing plaintiffs an opportunity to
challenge the reports' contents essentially allows the executive and
judicial branches of government to mandate First Amendment
claims without input or challenge from those most directly
affected. Second, it encourages a misconception that all
demonstrators are potential terrorists and criminals, thus subject
not only to penning at public protests, but to surveillance and
singling out even when they are not engaged in protesting. 1
55
, 156
Without admission of the event-specific threat evidence, the
Boston inquiry hinged on the second question asked above:
whether the city defendants' projections and suspicions based on
the Seattle and Los Angeles difficulties truly presented a
significant government interest sufficient to justify the
demonstration zone under Rock Against Racism. The Boston trial
court judge pronounced himself "satisfied that past experience at
comparable events . . . adequately supports each of the security
precautions at the DZ as reasonable., 157  The appellate panel
pointed out that while a government ought not be given free range
to "impose harsh burdens on the basis of isolated past events,"
the lower court's conclusion was reasonable enough to be
upheld. 5 9
While it is disturbing enough to First Amendment advocates
that the extreme form of the Boston demonstration zone was
upheld on the grounds of reports from unrelated, if similar events
in the past, it is additionally troubling when one considers the
153. Black Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 13; Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75
n.2.
154. Black Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 17-18 (Lipez, J., concurring).
155. See Barr, supra note 70.
156. Using such information could also constitute a Fourteenth Amendment
due process violation, an important inquiry which is, unfortunately, not germane
to this comment.
157. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75.




source of those reports. Affidavits from law enforcement
personnel will almost certainly be biased in favor of the
government. Indeed, subsequent reports from the Boston
convention suggested that some unruly protestor conduct had been
provoked by police aggression and preemptive actions.'
1 60
In the end, the Boston courts upheld the demonstration zone,
even as all involved knew it violated the plaintiff demonstrators'
First Amendment rights.' 6' The appellate concurrence closes with
a dash of regretful purple prose, conceding that the demonstration
zone offends the "spirit of the First Amendment," yet hopeful that
such spirit "will not be offended again."' 162 As Justice Marshall
feared, the Rock Against Racism test became, in these
circumstances, a show of minimal scrutiny and mandatory
deference which effectively gave "government officials a free hand
in achieving their policy ends" even if those ends remained
unsupported and evidentially undocumented.
163
After the dust settled from their failed litigation, demonstrators
at the Boston convention largely avoided the demonstration
zone. 164 Although as an actual structure, the zone apparently had
little effect on First Amendment rights, as a legal structure, it set a
dangerous precedent and allowed the city defendants to run
through a gaping hole in the Rock Against Racism test. Even
Boston's police superintendent, who devised the zone, referred to
it as the "constitutional infringement zone."' 65  Without fully
demonstrating a significant government interest, Boston's
authorities established a physical monument to the vulnerability of
First Amendment rights, tailored just as they saw fit.
2. Stauber: A Rational Approach
160. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Jacob Wheeler, Peaceful Protests Erupt Into
Violence Near Republican National Convention Barricades, Utne, Aug. 2004,
available at http://www.utne.com/web-special/web-specials_2004-08/articles
/11371-1.html.
161. Black Tea Soc 'y, 378 F.3d at 19 (Lipez, J., concurring); Coal. to Protest,
327 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
162. Black Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 19 (Lipez, J., concurring).
163. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803, 109 S. Ct. 2746,
2760 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Marcella Bombardieri, Boycott is Planned for Free-Speech Zone,
Boston Globe, July 25, 2004, at B8.
165. Was It Worth It?, supra note 13. As of several days before the
convention began, the only event organizers who still planned to use the zone
were demonstrators who wished to protest Israel's occupation of Palestine.
They felt the zone's miserable characteristics represented "symbolic value for
their particular message." Bombardieri, supra note 164.
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The New York City Stauber decision demonstrates that the
Rock Against Racism test can be applied in a balanced manner in
spite of considerable pressure to adopt the "worst case scenario"
mindset. The significant government interest in maintaining
sufficient police power to combat security concerns was given
proper weight, but the court demanded solid, event-specific
evidence to support the government's claims.
The Stauber case focused specifically on the New York City
police department's unwritten past policy of using metal barricades
to pen in protesters and the plaintiffs' expectation that police
would use the same practice at the 2004 Democratic National
Convention. 166  The plaintiffs' ability to detail the problems
resulting from excessive police constriction of the pens at the 2003
U. N. demonstration gave weight to their claim that the extant pens
policy amounted to an insufficiently narrowly tailored time, place,
and manner regulation.' 67 This advantage gained strength when
New York City's police chief conceded that entry and exit
modifications and consistent instructions to police personnel, two
adjustments sought by plaintiffs for the 2004 convention, could
probably be enacted so that the police department's legitimate law
enforcement interests and concerns about terrorism would not be
undermined. 
168
The New York City defendants did not raise any specific
security threats at the upcoming Republican National Convention
to bolster their case and the Stauber court expressly pointed out
this failure. The defendants did argue that the national government
considered the convention area to be a terrorism target, but the
court dismissed the defense's "general invocation of terrorist
threats" as overly vague in that it lacked the necessary attendant
evidence showing how the extant penning policies would stave off
such threats. 69 As one contemporary commentator noted, the easy
conflation of terrorists and protestors makes no sense upon
examination: "[t]he true domestic terrorists-the Tim McVeighs
of the world-are far more likely to be found in the trucks rigged
with bombs than in the pens set up for speech . . . The person
166. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL
1593870, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended July 19, 2004).
167. Id. at *29.
168. Id. at**10, 28.
169. Id. at ** 12, 31. These statements appear in the opinion sections dealing
with the police department's search policies, but the court's conclusion can be
extended to the pens policy.
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holding the placard is probably not the one we have to worry
about." 70
Fears of terrorism and demonstrators gone wild in New York
City during the 2004 convention, the "significant government
interest" claimed by the Stauber defendants, could easily have
swallowed up the other aspects of the court's analysis under Rock
Against Racism.171 However, the Stauber opinion is most striking
for its refusal to allow the city defendants' ungrounded suspicions
to override the constitutional query. Quite simply, the Stauber
plaintiffs ably demonstrated likely harm to their First Amendment
rights and requested pragmatic and moderate adjustments which
the defendants could not resist without showing likely and specific
harm to public safety in return.
C. "Narrowly Tailored."" A Standard in Decline
Perhaps the major jurisprudential innovation advanced in Rock
Against Racism was the Supreme Court majority's refinement of
the "narrowly tailored" standard. The Second Circuit appellate
panel which had previously heard the case, following what it
thought was appropriate and applicable precedent, rejected the city
noise regulation at issue because it was not the least restrictive
alternative sufficient to achieve the government's asserted interest
in noise control. 172 The Supreme Court majority, however, looked
to another line of precedent and found error in the Second Circuit's
conclusion that "narrowly tailored" meant "the least intrusive
means" of achieving the claimed significant government
interest.173 Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated
with some finality:
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today
170. Julie Hilden, The Constitutionality of Police-Imposed "Free-Speech"
Zones, Aug. 4, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/04/hilden.freespeech
/index.html.
171. In fact, as of the second week in August, well after this decision was
handed down, warnings about new security threats to the New York City
convention had been received: "Clearly the government believes that the
information about specific threats to specific buildings warrants a ramping-up of
security measures .... The specificity of detail does not necessarily make the
threats any more credible than the generic threat we already know about and live
with every day." Conventional Wisdom, N.Y. Observer, Aug. 9, 2004, available
at http://www.observer.com/pages/story.asp?ID=9390.
172. Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd,
491 U.S. 781, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
173. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797, 109 S. Ct. 2746,
2757 (1989).
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that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected
speech must be narrowly tailored.., but that it need not be
the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so...
[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government's interest.174
While this revised standard for the "narrowly tailored" element
may rest on solid precedent, 175 it contributes uncomfortably to a
trend allowing government and state actors ever greater latitude in
regulating First Amendment expression and assembly. As in Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, Justice Marshall
dissented in Rock Against Racism over this point.176  Justice
Marshall first asserted that the majority's expansion of the
"narrowly tailored" element rested on precedent language "taken
out of context."' 177  He then presented alternative recent
jurisprudence stating that a time, place, and manner restriction
"eliminates] no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to
remedy."178
Justice Marshall's primary criticism, as in Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, resided in his evident disgust at the
further degradation of the judiciary's crucial role in scrutinizing
government restrictions on First Amendment rights. In Justice
Marshall's view, the modified "narrowly tailored" rule "instructs
courts to refrain from examining how much speech may be
restricted to serve an asserted interest and how that level of
restriction is to be achieved. '' 179  The Rock Against Racism
majority's somewhat patronizing criticism of what it viewed as the
Second Circuit's erroneous "sifting" through available alternative
means to find a less restrictive alternative 8 and failure to "defer to
the city's reasonable determination"' 18 1 bears out Justice Marshall's
critique.
In the 2004 convention cases, this relaxed requirement and, in
fairness to the Boston courts, the extraordinary time constraints at
hand in that litigation, led to unfortunate results in Boston, less so
in New York City. The Boston trial court's opinion announced the
174. Id. at 798-800, 109 S. Ct. at 2757-58.
175. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298, 104 S.
Ct. 3065, 3071 (1984).
176. Ward, 491 U.S. at 803-07, 109 S. Ct. at 2760-63.
177. Id. at 804-05, 109 S. Ct. at 2761.
178. Id. at 804, 109 S. Ct. at 2761 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
485, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2503 (1988)).
179. Id. at 807, 109 S. Ct. at 2762.
180. Id. at 797, 109 S. Ct. at 2757.
181. Id. at 807, 109 S. Ct. at 2762 (citing majority opinion).
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court's responsibility to "consider . . . all [of] the relevant
circumstances" and make a "sound exercise of equitable
discretion, 1 82 then stated the Rock Against Racism rule that
"[n]arrow tailoring means that 'the means chosen are not
substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's
interest."""" Unfortunately, once the trial court accepted the
government's affidavits as to the influence of past events like the
2000 Los Angeles convention on the security plans for the 2004
Boston convention, the judge determined almost automatically that
the demonstration zone was indeed narrowly tailored, particularly
"given the constraints of time, geography, and safety."' 84
The First Circuit appellate panel spent somewhat more time
reviewing whether the demonstration zone indeed presented a
sufficiently narrow time, place, and manner regulation on protest
speech and assembly,' 85 but came to much the same conclusion.
Echoing the Rock Against Racism majority's extension of
"considerable respect" for the government's judgment, 186 the First
Circuit panel agreed with the trial court's assessment that the





The Stauber court exhibited significantly less deference to the
New York City convention defendants' discretion and judgment in
setting restrictions on speech and assembly in public fora. In fact,
the Stauber court's opinion made certain to express that the burden
of proving whether a restriction is narrowly tailored falls on the
government and not on the plaintiffs claiming First Amendment
violations,' 88 a point which the Supreme Court precedent and
Boston convention case opinions neglected to communicate. As
noted, the Stauber plaintiffs benefited tremendously from their past
experience with barricade pens at the 2003 demonstration and from
New York City Police Chief Joseph Esposito's concessions that
the desired adjustments would not significantly impair law
enforcement aims. 189  In their claim that the pens were
insufficiently narrowly tailored, the Stauber plaintiffs had recourse
182. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327
F. Supp. 2d 61, 69 (D. Mass. 2004).
183. Id. at 70 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 800, 109 S. Ct. at 2746).
184. Id. at 75.
185. Black Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12-14 (1st Cir. 2004).
186. Id. at 13.
187. Id. at 14.
188. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL
1593870, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended July 19, 2004).
189. Id. at *28.
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as well to another demonstration earlier in 2004 where a less
restrictive pens policy was employed without trouble.
The Stauber court concluded easily that the extant police
policy of metal barricade penning did not constitute a "narrowly
tailored" time, place, and manner restriction on the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights of speech and assembly. 190 The differences
between the Stauber and Boston convention case conclusions, so
strikingly diametric, led to incongruous end results: A
demonstration zone described by even casual observers as an
"internment camp" and a reminder of pre-unification East
Germany' 91 was permitted to stand while a relatively mild, yet still
problematic practice of enclosing protesters within waist-high
metal barricades was found to be unconstitutional. Although the
constraints claimed by the Boston courts seem as valid as the
wealth of evidence presented by the New York City plaintiffs, the
decisions still seem incongruous and, despite the Supreme Court's
apparent clarification in Rock Against Racism, reasonable and
learned minds can and do still disagree about the nature of narrow
tailoring.
D. The Alternative Channels Factor
The final element of the Rock Against Racism test that played
out in the 2004 convention cases is the factor stating that time,
place, and manner restrictions on First Amendment rights of
speech and expression in public fora must be such as to "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information. 1 9 2 This factor is listed last in the standard test and
often receives the least degree of judicial attention. For example,
the Supreme Court majority in Rock Against Racism concluded, in
a few brief sentences at the close of its opinion, that the noise
regulation at issue in that matter left open ample alternatives
because the regulation restricted only the volume of the plaintiffs'
expression and not the style or substance of the expression itself.1
93
Case decisions paying greater attention to this factor have
developed some rough guidelines. The main principle holds that
190. Id. at *29.
191. These observations were made, respectively, by one of the construction
workers who installed the zone and a curious commuter who viewed the zone on
his way to work. Editorial, An Oppressive Zone, Boston Globe, July 22, 2004,
at A10; Saltzman, Protest Zone Draws Ire, supra note 14.
192. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746,
2753 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3069 (1984)).
193. Id. at 803, 109 S. Ct. at 2760.
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"a speech restriction will be struck down . . . only if it largely
impairs a speaker's capacity to reach [his or] her intended
audience. ' ' r However, it is not clear whether a court should
contemplate modifications that could increase accessibility or
consider separate, independent modes of communication which
might provide a speaker with the capacity to reach his or her
intended audience if the disputed regulation is deployed as
intended by the government.
The trial court judge in the 2004 Boston convention case
viewed the "narrowly tailored" and "alternative channels"
segments of the Rock Against Racism test as conceptually
interrelated, 195 blurring the two factors by referring to the "lesser
or least restrictive alternative" aspect of the "narrowly tailored"
Rock Against Racism test element, as discussed above. However,
once the judge concluded the zone was indeed narrowly tailored to
serve the government's asserted (if evidentially unsupported)
interest in maximizing security, time and spatial realities precluded
any modifications which might have provided alternative
expressive channels for the plaintiffs.
196
The First Circuit appellate panel reached much the same
conclusions by following the second suggested conception of
"alternative channels," in which it remains an inquiry independent
of the "narrowly tailored" analysis factor. The panel ignored the
notion of modifying the zone, noting that it did indeed afford
protesters "sight and sound" contact with convention delegates,
albeit in a less than optimum manner.' 97 Instead, the panel focused
on the Boston security plan as a whole and pointed out several
available alternatives. Demonstrators could take their message to
the "soft zone" in small groups or they could relocate elsewhere in
Boston and demonstrate in larger groups at other public spaces
throughout the city, subject to regulations at those sites.' 98
The appellate panel concluded its discussion of alternative
channels with a fairly stunning suggestion. In its view, the protest
plaintiffs' position "greatly underestimate[d] the nature of modem
communications . . . [a]t a high-profile event such as the
Convention' '1 99 and overestimated the effectiveness of direct
194. Kevin Francis O'Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45
Loy. L. Rev. 411, 446-47 (1999).
195. Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat'l Convention v. City of Boston, 327
F. Supp. 2d 61, 70 (D. Mass. 2004).
196. Id. at 75-76.
197. Black Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004).
198. Twenty or fewer people could demonstrate informally and up to fifty
people could stage a demonstration upon receipt of a permit. Id.
199. Id.
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interaction with one's desired audience. To the appellate panel's
way of thinking, a protester's ability to communicate first-hand
with his or her audience, however desirable, is no different than
having the message reach convention delegates by means of
"television, radio, the press, the internet, and other outlets."
200
This logical leap by the First Circuit panel conveniently
sidesteps the severely problematic nature of the demonstration
zone, a state of affairs the trial court judge at least attempted to
rectify on paper. More disconcertingly, it lifts the veil on what
appears to be a thinly concealed distaste and even disgust for the
tradition of public protest in the United States. The First Circuit
panel's suggestion implies that protest groups should either pool
their assets and buy advertising time and space in Boston's media
outlets or assemble en masse in some other location and hope that
media coverage will land them on newscasts which may or may
not be seen by delegates in their hotel rooms.
20 1
As to the first possibility, Justice Marshall averred in his Clark
v. Community for Creative Non- Violence dissent that the trend
toward greater restriction of public protest tended systematically to
minimize and even silence the voices of those who lack the
financial and political ability to convey their views through
traditional and expensive modes of access like paid media and
legislative lobbying. 20 2  As to the second possibility, the First
Circuit's suggestion that protesters' ability to impact convention
delegates from other parts of Boston would serve as a viable
alternative to an improved demonstration zone outside the Fleet
Center, the panel itself underestimated the gravitational pull of the
convention site as the center of media attention. In any reasonable
estimation, the panel's implied media alternatives could in no
manner viably serve as an alternative channel for the Boston
protesters' lost capacity to directly reach their intended audience,
the delegates.
Turning to New York City, the Stauber court wisely limited
itself to analysis of the actual and feasible alternatives available
with respect to the disputed regulation.20 3  It found the police
department's constrictive penning policy unreasonable for the
simple reason that it "may leave an individual with no alternative
200. Id.
201. It is unlikely that many delegates spend a great deal of time absorbing
local media output during the convention due to the probability that scheduled
meetings and events, the main attractions on the convention floor, and other
entertainments consume the bulk of their time.
202. 468 U.S. 288, 314-16, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3080 (1984).
203. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL
1593870, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended July 19, 2004).
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but to remain at a demonstration when she would prefer not to
participate any longer." 20 4  The court pointed out that the First
Amendment protects one's right to cease demonstrating no less
than the right to demonstrate, citing Supreme Court authority to
that effectus
Again, the striking distance between the Boston and New York
opinions demonstrates the inconsistencies that can occur when
different courts apply the same basic test. As noted throughout this
comment, the differences between these cases can be found in their
distinct fact patterns, the different cultures of the two cities
involved, and even, one might venture, in the makeup of the judges
who decided the cases.20 6 In concluding this treatment of how the
courts applied the Rock Against Racism test to the 2004 convention
pen and zone cases, however, two crucial additional elements must
be examined that raise yet more doubts as to the applicability of
the test in its current form to protest pens and zones.
E. Time Constraints and the Lack of Standards or Representation
Two final concerns with the protest pen and demonstration
zone schemes implemented at the 2004 conventions must be
addressed. First, time concerns played far too great a role in
whether or not the courts could render adequate protection to the
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Second, the fact that such ad
hoc schemes differ distinctly from the types of written ordinances
and longstanding or promulgated policies normally subject to
analysis under Rock Against Racism distinguishes them from the
mass of disputes over time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech and assembly in public fora. The Rock Against Racism test
cannot adequately confront these factors, yet these very factors
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 1435
(1977)).
206. While many reject the view that a judge's political background should
be considered when evaluating his or her decisions, others find such information
valuable. Judge Douglas Woodlock and Judge Bruce Selya, who wrote the
Boston trial and appellate opinions respectively, are both appointees of Ronald
Reagan, one of the more conservative Presidents of the modem era. By contrast,
Judge Robert Sweet, who wrote Stauber, presents staunch liberal credentials,
having served as deputy mayor of New York City during John Linsday's
mayoralty in the late 1960s before being appointed by President Jimmy Carter
during his term from 1976 to 1980. Bruce Selya, Robert Sweet, Douglas
Woodlock-Biography, http://air.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (search for Selya,




contributed significantly to the results of the 2004 convention
cases.
1. Time Constraints
In Boston, time constraints dramatically affected the case's
outcome by closing off alternatives which might have rendered the
demonstration zone somewhat more acceptable.2 °7 Negotiations
between protest groups and convention planners began in January
2003, long in advance of the convention. 20 8 It seems clear from
available news sources that a mutually acceptable solution had
been reached as to the zone's location by May 2004,209 but the
zone itself was not constructed until just one week prior to the
convention opening.
210
As to the last-minute timing of the Boston suit, the appellate
panel's majority opinion shunned the plaintiffs' request for
"eleventh-hour injunctive relief' and critiqued the plaintiffs'
apparent tardiness in filing suit "despite considerable ... notice of
the planned security measures."21' This criticism was plainly
wrong. The trial judge's opinion clearly stated that the zone had
only been constructed one week prior to the convention and the
plaintiffs filed suit two days thereafter.21 2 Either the appellate
panel missed these sentences or, conveniently, chose to ignore
them in its apparent disdain for the whole matter in its lap. The
appellate concurrence echoed these sentiments, adding that
"adequate time to seek recourse in the courts means months or at
least weeks ...[i]t does not mean five days before the event
begins.
2 13
207. Black Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2004);
Coal. to Protest v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 69 (D. Mass. 2004).
208. Impasse Seen on Protest Talks, supra note 55.
209. Editorial, Protecting Protests, Boston Globe, May 18, 2004, at A10.
210. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 68. It is not clear whether the
convention planners intentionally waited as a ploy to forestall complaints about
the completed zone or if the zone simply fell to the bottom of the priority list.
Kevin Joy, Doubts Raised on Protest Site, Boston Globe, May 25, 2004, at A4.
In addition, the abandoned train tracks overhead and the supportive girders
which contributed to the zone's "internment camp" feel were scheduled to be
torn down prior to the convention, but had not been removed in time. An
Oppressive Zone, supra note 191.
211. Black Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 15.
212. Coal. to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
213. Black Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 16.
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In New York City, the Stauber plaintiffs, largely due to their
experiences at the 2003 demonstration, fortunately filed suit almost
one year in advance of the 2004 convention and moved for
injunction nearly two months before the convention opening
date.2 14  Due to this relative luxury of time, the Stauber court
produced a fully fleshed-out treatment of the precedents and issues
in its opinion, culminating with the injunction which gave New
York City's police department roughly forty days to enact
reasonable modifications to the pen policy.
215
The results in the Boston cases and Stauber demonstrate that a
First Amendment claim challenging protest pens or demonstration
zones may fail or succeed depending on when suit is filed. This
disparity sets a dangerous precedent. In the future, planners of
conventions or other similar events may actively choose to
replicate the Boston scheme of unveiling a pen or zone as late as
possible, confident that any First Amendment claims will be
denied for lack of time and suitable options, regardless of whether
or not a violation occurs. That this type of violation takes place
within the framework of the Rock Against Racism test bears out
Justice Marshall's fears that time, place, and manner jurisprudence
could easily be used to harm, rather than protect, the First
Amendment rights of those who take their message to the streets.
2. Lack of Legislative or Representative Input
Pen and zone security schemes, if properly employed, reside
within the police power of a state or municipality, but they are not
the results of debate and negotiation by elected representatives like
state legislators or city council members, nor are they policies
accepted or at least recognized through continued practice or
promulgation. Although neither convention case dealt with this
particular issue, it deserves inclusion in this analysis as a further
factor contributing to the manner in which pen and zone schemes
can violate First Amendment rights.
No clearly stated rule has emerged to dictate the extent to
which police power alone, without a legislative action or
longstanding policy in place, may regulate the time, place, and
manner of expression and assembly in public fora. Grider v.
Abramson, a 1999 Sixth Circuit case involving security
arrangements for a Ku Klux Klan rally, shares some factual
214. Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL
1593870, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended July 19, 2004).
215. Id. at*33.
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features with the pen and zone lawsuits at issue in this comment. 2 16
The Grider plaintiffs claimed that the disputed security plan should
be ruled a per se First Amendment violation because it had been
enacted "in the absence of any legislative authorization or approval
by official policymakers." 217 The plaintiffs supported their claim
by recourse to a line of decisions mandating that locality discretion
to award permits for use of public space cannot be unguided or
unrestrained.218 The Sixth Circuit disagreed, described the Grider
plaintiffs' assertion as misconceived, and averred that even had the
disputed regulation been enacted without legislative guidance or
standards, such schemes were indeed within the general police
power of states and their local subdivisions to regulate
"community health and safety. ' 219
Although, to a degree, this may be the case, the Grider
plaintiffs' assertion merits attention. The Supreme Court has not
yet set rules regarding standardless and unlegislated time, place,
and manner regulations on expression and assembly in public fora.
The overwhelming majority of cases the Court has subjected to
such analysis have resulted from disputes over written ordinances
or at least fairly settled and promulgated policies and
regulations. 220 The only recent case where some analogy may be
drawn is Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes.221 In that dispute, Arkansas' public television
broadcasting agency decided to limit participants in an aired pre-
election political debate to major party candidates, thus rejecting
216. Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1020, 120 S. Ct. 528 (1999) (KKK rally and counter-demonstration physically
segregated by police-occupied buffer zone and separated from general public
area by larger restricted area perimeter).
217. Id. at 747.
218. Id. (citing Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 112
S. Ct. 2395 (1992); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 S. Ct. 312 (1951);
Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S. Ct. 275 (1991)).
219. Id. at 747-48.
220. Thomas v. City of Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 122 S. Ct. 775
(2002) (municipal park ordinance); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S. Ct.
2480 (2000) (state criminal statute); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (municipal noise regulation); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988) (municipal anti-picketing ordinance); Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) (U.S.
Park Service camping regulation).
221. 523 U.S. 666, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
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the bid of the plaintiff, an independent candidate with a fairly
minor following.
222
The Arkansas public television commission board had been
purposely set up to be strongly insulated from problems associated
with political pressure and partisanship and it had been granted
broad editorial discretion as to programming decisions.2 3 Thus, it
shares some characteristics with the police departments and federal
security entities entrusted with planning security for the 2004
conventions. Both were largely shielded from the vicissitudes of
public opinion and enjoyed fairly broad discretion and latitude to
perform their duties. 22
Although the Court decided Forbes for the defendants on the
grounds that the aired debate constituted a non-public forum
demanding mere rationality review, Justice John Paul Stevens
raised concerns in dissent about the majority's deference to the
defendant state agency. In Justice Stevens' view, this stance
allowed dangerously for "nearly limitless discretion," risk of
government censorship, and ad hoc decisions lacking recourse to
standardized objectives. 225
Although the Forbes majority decision suggests that
government authorities' ad hoc "forum housekeeping measures"
226
can receive a great deal of deference, not all courts have agreed.
Courts having jurisdiction over New York City, in particular, have
shown a marked refusal to defer easily to police penning and
demonstration schemes. Despite its age, the 1986 Second Circuit
222. Id. at 669-71, 118 S. Ct. at 1637-38.
223. Id. at 669-70, 673-74, 118 S. Ct. at 1637, 1639-40.
224. The Court has even referred to editorial discretion as a "power"
exercised to regulate speech activity, not unlike the role of the convention case
defendants in devising the security pens and zones. Id. at 673-74, 118 S. Ct. at
1639 (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636, 114
S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124, 93 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (1973)).
225. Id, at 686, 689, 118 S. Ct. at 1645, 1647.
226. O'Neill, supra note 194, at 514 (citing Concerned Jewish Youth v.
McGuire, 621 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S. Ct.
1452 (1981)); Fischer v. City of St. Paul, 894 F. Supp. 1318, 1323, 1328-29 (D.
Minn. 1995); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of New York,
504 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)); see also United Food & Commercial
Workers, Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004); Grider v.
Abramson, 180 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1020, 120 S. Ct.
528 (1999).
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case of Olivieri v. Ward,227 one in a string of lawsuits brought by
gay activists to challenge various city restrictions and permit
rejections in association with New York City's annual St. Patrick's
Day parade, presents a clear statement of judicial non-deference in
its refusal to "kowtow without question to agency expertise" and
thus to abandon its "independent responsibility to examine the
constitutionality of First Amendment restrictions. '" 228
The Olivieri court ultimately rejected as overly restrictive a
New York City Police Department penning scheme, replacing it
with a more balanced compromise. 22 9 More recently, the Southern
District of New York has rejected ad hoc regulations formulated to
limit assemblies on New York's city hall steps and adjacent plaza
and the Police Department's refusal to allow a rally in Harlem. 23 0
In the context of these same-jurisdiction decisions, the Stauber
court's ruling in the 2004 New York City convention case is not
unusual, but it runs counter to an otherwise seemingly national
judicial trend affording significant deference to the public forum
"housekeeping" measures of law enforcement agencies. These
agencies, generally police departments and the Secret Service, are
largely removed from direct public and political accountability.
However, they assert significant influence over the nation's public
spaces where free expression and assembly have traditionally been
afforded strong First Amendment protection. This deference trend
can obscure aspects of the First Amendment inquiry, such as
whether a planned scheme is content-based or neutral, whether the
government interest being claimed has evidential support, and
whether the scheme is narrowly tailored. The Second Circuit
recognized as much in Olivieri, recalling the concerns voiced by
Justices Marshall and Scalia: "Because the excuses offered for
refusing to permit the fullest scope of free speech are often
disguised, a court must carefully sort through the reasons offered
to see if they are genuine. ' 231
227. 801 F. 2d 602 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917, 107 S. Ct.
1371 (1987).
228. Id. at 606, 607. Although the trial court in the Boston convention
demonstration zone case cited Olivieri as an exemplar of proper police penning,
it was ultimately resolved by judge-mandated compromise, not deference to
police procedures and policies. Id. at 608.
229. Id. at 608.
230. Housing Works, Inc. v. Safir, 101 F. Supp. 2d 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Million Youth March v. Safir, 63 F. Supp. 2d 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
231. Olivieri, 801 F.2d at 606 (quoting Olivieri v. Ward, 766 F.2d 690, 691
(2d Cir. 1985) (a previous incarnation of the same lawsuit, brought annually for
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The Boston convention cases demonstrated this danger and
exemplify how large scale events like political conventions, global
trade conferences, and the Olympics can swiftly move beyond the
control of a city's elected leaders and representatives. Although an
elected official like Boston's mayor Tom Menino plays a great role
in bringing a convention to a host city, once the convention
planners, party leaders, Secret Service and other security personnel
begin planning their operations, the "normal" urban authorities
must retreat to the sidelines.232 At that point, costly and potentially
repressive decisions233 are increasingly made by people who need
not concern themselves with reelection. After the Boston
convention concluded, both Mayor Menino and the host committee
president noted that despite their role in arranging logistics for the
convention, the extreme security measures taken in preparation for
the convention were effectively beyond their control.
234
F. Analysis Conclusion
In closing, security schemes for protest pens and demonstration
zones at large scale urban events present special problems which
remain unresolved under the traditional manner of analyzing public
forum time, place, and manner regulations. As a first concern, one
cannot presume that such schemes are content-neutral. Although
they are neither justified with regard to the specific content of
protest speech nor set up to favor one protest viewpoint over
another, they are instituted to contain all forms of protest speech
through an exercise of police power. Although such schemes can
be designed to function reasonably and constitutionally, more
attention must be given to the unspoken motives behind their
superficial neutrality. As ad hoc regulations made by agencies and
years by homosexuals who protested various aspects of New York City's annual
St. Patrick's Day parade).
232. Was It Worth It?, supra note 13.
233. These decisions often affect far more people than protestors. The
Boston and New York City convention security schemes effectively closed off
large portions of roadways and public transportation and impacted retail
businesses in the areas surrounding the convention arena sites. Estes, supra note
15; Cullen, supra note 17; Rick Klein, Convention Must Change, Planner Says:
Urban Site is Less Likely to be Chosen, Boston Globe, Aug. 1, 2004, at Al; Was
It Worth It?, supra note 13; Slackman, Penn Station, supra note 141; Slackman,
Collision of Security, supra note 18; Hu & Slackman, supra note 18.
234. Klein, supra note 233.
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entities with little public accountability, they entail some
likelihood of being content-oriented.
Second, the security concerns at issue may be significant, but
extreme security measures should not be justified without some
evidence that an actual threat exists and that the proposed measures
are narrowly tailored to meet it. It is unlikely the nation will be
caught off guard again as it was in 2001, but readiness must rest on
more than memories and shadowy projections.
Finally, event authorities must not be permitted to drag their
feet before revealing their security plans to demonstration
organizers. The less time is made available in advance for a
somewhat open exchange of positions or an effective and fair
judicial resolution, the less time will be available to fashion
reasonable and comparable alternative channels for protestors to
express their views. Fifty protesters cannot convey their message
as powerfully as five thousand or fifty thousand protestors. Pen
and zone schemes minimize the message by limiting those who
wish to express it. Time alone should not be the reason First
Amendment rights are diminished.
IV. A PROPOSAL
Protest pen and demonstration zone schemes should be
planned, implemented, and scrutinized in a more probing and open
manner. Political conventions are awarded to host cities roughly
two years ahead.235 Although this should afford enough time for
protest organizations, city authorities, and security planners to
reach arrangements that will account in some degree for both First
Amendment rights and police power, this has not been the case.
Three of the past four conventions have been riddled with litigation
so close to the convention opening date that whatever the judicial
holding, rancor and ill-will have exacerbated the actual relations
between protestors and police during the conventions. While this
might make for exciting news footage, it leaves the basic problem
unresolved. The following suggestions may provide avenues for
compromise.
Shortly after the naming of a convention city, a committee
should be formed consisting of representatives from the city's
elected officials, police and other emergency response personnel,
235. The Democratic National Committee officially awarded the 2004
convention to Boston in November 2002. Ralph Ranalli, Critics Say $10
M(illion) Budget Not Enough to Protect Convention: Amount Less Than Half
That of 2000 Assembly in L.A., Boston Globe, Nov. 14, 2002, at A29.
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protest organization leaders,236 and the Secret Service, which has
field offices in all major United States cities.237 This committee
should be charged with proposing and designing accommodations
for demonstrations which will neither impair security procedures
nor resign protestors to zones either too distant or too harshly
designed to suit the many groups who wish to peacefully gather
and demonstrate. Obviously, there will be groups who reject any
restriction or feel unrepresented and the officials may resist sharing
information, but once a dialogue has commenced amongst those
who can look to the 2000 and 2004 experiences and use them to
tailor and refine plans, perhaps there will be less combativeness
and more cooperation.
Should this committee reach a dead end, alternative dispute
resolution (ADR), scheduled as far in advance of the convention as
possible, may provide a relatively neutral forum one level above
the committee meeting room. Whether mediation or arbitration is
selected, provisions must be in place to ensure good faith,
reasonable compromise, and a neutral intermediary. Although
ADR has its critics, it is still less expensive and combative than
litigation.
In the event that the preceding two measures fail to produce a
peaceful plan where security concerns and demonstration spaces
can co-exist, litigation may indeed be the last resort. However, the
Rock Against Racism test should be modified to afford greater
protection of demonstration groups' First Amendment rights,
which, as the preceding analysis shows, can be quite vulnerable
and expendable. Although some convention protesters might not
appreciate the comparison, many similarities exist between their
tribulations and those of pro-life activists who gather outside
clinics and facilities where abortions are performed. Both groups
are seen as somewhat threatening and dangerous to the safety and
peace of their audiences, who tend to be a specific group of
persons at a specific physical place, be it a clinic or a convention
hall. Both groups have also often wound up in courtrooms fighting
for their First Amendment rights against regulations created to
physically segregate them from their intended audiences or court
orders imposed on them after the fact.
236. While it is true that organizations and groups do not speak for all those
individuals who may join a march or a demonstration, they play a significant
role in planning and publicizing protest events and thus their participation in
sessions devising security arrangements can be invaluable.




The resolutions of two recent Supreme Court cases dealing
with abortion clinic protestors may be analogized to litigation
arising over the use of protest pens and demonstration zones. In
Madsen v. Women's Health Center,238 decided in 1994, and three
years later in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New
York,239 the Supreme Court found that injunctions issued against
pro-life protesters (as opposed to general ordinances regulating
pro-life speech as in the case of Hill v. Colorado240) should be held
to a slightly higher degree of judicial scrutiny than the current
Rock Against Racism intermediate level.24' In essence, this higher
degree of scrutiny resembles nothing so much as the "least
restrictive option available" standard that Justice Marshall wrote
had been eradicated by the majority ruling in Rock Against Racism.
Justice William Rehnquist, who penned both majority opinions
in Madsen and Schenck, contrasted injunctions with statutes in
Madsen.242  Statutes, which are drafted to address "particular
societal interests" pertaining to the general public, represent
"legislative choice[s]. ' 243 Injunctions, by their nature, apply only
to a specific group or individual and they operate to regulate the
activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group or individual.244
Like security measures, injunctions also regulate the potential
future conduct of the group or individual they target. Justice
Rehnquist further noted that because injunctions are so specifically
directed, the threat of censorship and discriminatory application
can be greater than with statutes.
Thus, according to Justice Rehnquist and his majority, when an
injunction impacting First Amendment rights is analyzed, it should
be held to a "somewhat more stringent"246 application of the
standard test elements for time, place, and manner regulations. In
particular, the Madsen Court found that the "narrowly tailored"
element should be adjusted upward when dealing with injunctions,
so that the injunction imposed "burden[s] no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest."
247
238. 512 U.S. 753, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
239. 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
240. 530 U.S. 703, 120 S. Ct. 2480; see supra text accompanying note 132.
241. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 372, 117 S. Ct. at 864; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765,
114 S. Ct. at 2525.
242. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
243. Id. at 764.
244. Id. at 762, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
245. Id. at 764-65, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
246. Id. at 765, 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
247. Id., 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
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In essence, then, the Madsen Court carved out an exception to
Rock Against Racism that applies when First Amendment rights
are threatened by injunctions rather than general ordinances.
Although Justice Scalia wrote in dissent that injunctions should be
held to strict scrutiny rather than the slightly heightened
intermediate scrutiny which the majority proposed,2 8 by the time
the new rule was confirmed in Schenck, he did not dispute that
particular aspect of the ruling.
249
Demonstration zone and protest pen schemes resemble the
injunctions addressed in Madsen and Schenck. Pen and zone
schemes tend to be detailed, precise, and "directed at particular
individuals because of their particular conduct," 250 in this case
political protesters rather than pro-life activists. Like injunctions,
pen and zone schemes are also generally created by non-elected
figures that tend to be largely insulated from public
accountability-police departments, convention planners and the
Secret Service. This comment, in conclusion, argues that the
Madsen and Schenck heightened standard of review for
injunctions, a rule requiring that they be framed so as to burden no
more speech than necessary, be extended to pen and zone schemes,
which have the power to excessively infringe protesters' First
Amendment rights under the current Rock Against Racism test
standard.251 The rights of protest and demonstration, out of which
a revolutionary consciousness formed over two hundred years ago,
deserve at least this much.
CONCLUSION: FouR MORE YEARS
On the last day of the 2004 Democratic National Convention in
Boston, a band of demonstrators near the Fleet Center (and
ostensibly outside the much-reviled demonstration zone) burned a
248. Id. at 792, 114 S. Ct. at 2538.
249. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357,
374, 117 S. Ct. 855, 865 (1997).
250. O'Neill, supra note 194, at 509-10.
251. The notion that protestors might bring suits alleging deprivation of their
constitutional rights after events occur presents an intriguing alternative to pre-
event negotiations, ADR, or litigation. The plaintiffs in Stauber v. City of New
York had some success with the portion of their suit claiming injuries and losses
sustained through police penning actions at the 2003 demonstration. No. 03
Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 159870, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004, as amended
July 19, 2004). That litigation might serve as a model for future individuals and
groups frustrated by efforts to negotiate pre-event compromises with event
security planners and unsure if litigation before the event will succeed.
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two-faced effigy representing President George W. Bush and his
opponent, Senator John Kerry. 252 One cannot say how many
demonstrators that day knew they were reenacting a ritual that
spurred revolutionary sentiment against seemingly insurmountable
odds over two centuries earlier. That now-ancient demonstration,
the Stamp Act "riot" in colonial Boston, set in motion a ragged yet
unbroken chain of public mass protest which has always heralded
significant political and social change in the United States. Were
the colonial rioters to be brought into court today, they would be
subjected to the same standards the courts applied to the 2004
convention demonstration sites. With the re-election of President
Bush, the Supreme Court seems likely to continue its policy of
increasing deference to government authorities' plans for securing
public spaces and compartmentalizing the freedoms of speech and
assembly. Yet, protests will continue as they always have. One
can only hope the First Amendment will remain strong enough to
protect them. In the words of anthropologist Margaret Mead,
"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens
can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has."
Susan Rachel Nanes
252. Marcella Bombardieri et al., Demonstrators, Police Tangle: Three
Arrested, Boston Globe, July 30, 2004, at A13.
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